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I. Introduction
In recent years, nationalist movements have re-emerged as a prominent force in global
politics, particularly throughout Europe.1 While nationalism has a storied history across the
European continent, the horrors of both world wars in the first half of the twentieth century inspired
the creation of international liberal2 institutions as a means to encourage transnational cooperation
and diplomacy, in the hopes of preventing a resurgence of the types of dangerous nationalism that
led to the bloodiest armed conflict in modern history. 3 These institutions have been largely
successful in encouraging a cooperative international order within Europe.4 Recently, however,
powerful nationalist movements have sprouted largely as a backlash against an influx of migrants
and refugees and a European Union mandate of shared responsibility receive them.5 These
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1 Fielder, infra note 84.
2 “Liberalism,” like many other abstract political doctrines is difficult to define. For the purposes of this paper, it
suffices to draw on John Rawls’ exposition that liberalism is an answer to the “fundamental question about political
justice in a democratic society, namely what is the most appropriate conception of justice for specifying the fair
terms of social cooperation between citizens regarded as free and equal, and as fully cooperating members of society
… from one generation to the next.” JOHN RAWLS, 3 POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). Analogized to the global order,
we may understand nation-states as taking the place of citizens, and voluntary international institutions as the
society’s governing body. Thus, there is a “fair system of cooperation [by means of] … publicly recognized rules
and procedures that those cooperating accept and regard as properly regulating their conduct” id. at 15–16, among
nations “deeply divided on religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines.” Id. at 10.
3 See, e.g., John Horne, The First World War: The Aftermath, THE I RISH TIMES (Apr. 24, 2018),
https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/heritage/the-first-world-war-the-aftermath-1.3452686.
4 See, e.g., Snyder, infra note 14 at 57 (“For the first few decades following World War II, embedded liberalism …
succeeded in granting autonomy and democratic legitimacy to nation-states while curbing aggressive nationalism”);
see also Fielder, infra note 84 at 226 for the more blunt summation that “The EU reduces European border
conflicts;” Fox and Vermeersch, infra note 97 at 340 (“[N]ationalism and its retrograde derivatives were
incompatible with the EU’s plans for a postnational Europe.”).
5 Ashok Swain, Increasing Migration Pressure and Rising Nationalism: Implications for Multilateralism and SDG
Implementation (June 2019), https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp content/uploads/sites/45/publication/SDO_BP_Swain.pdf.

movements have had varying political and electoral success within their countries. The most clearcut example of such success for an anti-international ideology is the 2016 Brexit referendum, with
which Great Britain voted to remove itself from the European Union. 6
Many commentators and scholars have espoused that nationalism is inherently dangerous
for the human rights that liberal international bodies are meant to protect. 7

While this is

undoubtedly true in certain situations, particularly where nationalism is based on a theory of ethnic
superiority, it is not universal and is better understood as too broad an assertion. In the case of
Brexit, nationalism has indeed presented itself as a threat to the human rights of British and Irish
citizens living under British rule in Northern Ireland.8 However, these threats could be neutralized
by a revitalization of Northern Irish nationalism, which with political success, could expel Britain
as its ruler and rejoin politically with the Republic of Ireland. As the Republic of Ireland is a
member of the European Union without plans to remove itself, nationalism in this situation would
in fact work as a safeguard for the human rights currently protected by the European Union (EU).
This comment seeks to challenge common conceptions of nationalism as being inherently
dangerous, as well as definitions of human rights which do not include an economic element.
Using Northern Ireland’s nationalist fight for home rule rather than British occupation, this
comment will demonstrate that at least in that case, nationalism can actually protect human rights
rather than threaten them, especially once one acknowledges that economic rights should be

James Rodgers, Brexit Caps Nigel Farage’s Unexpected Rise, and the Triumph of Nationa lism Over Liberalism,
NBC NEWS (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/brexit -caps-nigel-farage-s-unexpected-risetriumph-nationalism-over-ncna1126881.
7 E.g., Fielder, infra note 84 at 232 (“[Without a] European identity, nationalist identities will grow, which are often
a platform for xenophobia, racism, and actions that will severely impact human rights.”); Fox and Vermeersch, infra
note 97 at 343 (“Much of the recent headline grabbing nationalist activity in the region, from violence against Roma
in Hungary to the anti-Semitic activities of skinheads in Poland, has occurred not only outside mainstream and EU
political norms and structures but in many cases in explicit defiance of them.” (Emphasis added)).
8 Benjamin Ward, UK’s Bid for Brexit at All Costs Will Damage Human Rights, H UMAN R IGHTS WATCH (Sept. 11,
2020), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/11/uks-bid-brexit-all-costs-will-damage-human-rights#.
6

included in any characterization of human rights. Part II of this comment will briefly delineate the
rise of the modern European nation-state and explain the symbiotic relationship between the
development of such states and nationalist ideologies, culminating in a short history of the preWWII European nationalist movements whose existence led directly to liberal international
institutions meant to protect human rights, such as the European Union (EU). Part III will look at
some of the nationalist movements with significant power in Europe today, specifically in Hungary
and the United Kingdom, and explain how these movements endanger human rights. Part IV will
provide a short history of the successful nationalist movement in India, as well as an explanation
of the historical underpinnings of nationalism in Northern Ireland. It will then posit an argument
that political success for Northern Irish nationalists today could actually protect against the threats
to human rights posed by Brexit.
II. A Brief History of The Modern Nation and Nationalism
In today’s world, it is difficult to envision a global order without nation-states. In many
ways, the international regime and some of the most pressing cross-border issues have already
moved beyond the actions of national governments and instead are dominated by globalized nonstate actors.9 However, simple logic tells us that the modern conception of a nation-state had to
have developed at some point, or we would still be in the age of empires. This leaves questions
of what defines a modern nation and when the nation as we know it came to exist, and the
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The most obvious example of this is political violence, or its more commonplace term of terrorism, committed
frequently by “the quintessential illegal non-state actor,” namely, transnational terrorist groups like Al Qaeda or
Boko Haram. Neal A. Pollard, Globalization’s Bastards: Illegitimate Non-State Actors in International Law, 210
I NT’L LAW, LOW I NTENSITY CONFLICT & LAW ENFORCEMENT 211 (2002). However, there are several less glaring
examples of non-state actors displacing the roles associated with the state, such as multinational corporations
operating as “a substitute for the market as a method of organizing international exchange” Stephen Hymer, The
Efficiency (Contradictions) of Multinational Corporations, 441 THE AM. ECON. REV. 441 (1970) and of course the
subject of human rights, which though “ultimately implemented and ensured by states,” are greatly influenced by
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like Amnesty International. WENDY WONG, 29 I NTERNAL AFFAIRS: H OW
THE STRUCTURE OF NGOS TRANSFORMS H UMAN R IGHTS (2012).

subsequent question of the role nationalism played in that development or vice versa. This
section provides necessary background information on the rise of the modern European nation,
the phases of European nationalism which occurred in conjunction with the switch from
monarchies to constitutional democracies, and the creation of international institutions to prevent
recurrence of the evils brought on by some of those nationalist movements.
A. The Spring of Nations: The Development of the Modern European Nation in 1848

Europe is no stranger to nationalism.

While many people today would think of the

European kingdoms of the late Middle Ages as “nations,” most nations as we now define them10
did not exist until after the French and American Revolutions in the late eighteenth-century.11 Of
course, human beings have been grouped territorially and with at least a myth of common ancestry
since far before that, and “in most cases, [there is] a more or less powerful link between modern
nations and pre-existing, and often pre-modern, [ethnic communities].”12

While more civic-

focused elements later came to relevance in the evolution from ethnic communities to “nations,”
one still present and important aspect of many national identities is its “ethno-history,” or the
shared, subjective understanding of the communal history as opposed to the objective version of
it that an outsider might describe.13 As time went on, modern states “increasingly fused with [their]

The sociologist Anthony Smith defines a modern nation as “a named human population sharing an historic
territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal
rights and duties for all members,” Smith, infra note 11, at 24. For others, a “nation” can be found where “a majority
of the designated population participates in public life” or where “a sign ificant minority of the population outside the
ruling elite reveal a national consciousness.” Id. at n. 2 (citations omitted). These alternative definitions, however,
are both too overinclusive, in that the latter could include territorial kingdoms going b ack well before anything like a
modern nation could be said to exist, and too underinclusive, in that the former would call into question whether a
democratic country in which the majority of voting-eligible citizens do not vote is indeed a “nation.” For Smith,
these definitions would more appropriately describe “pre-nations,” as they could exist before the key processes of
nation development (i.e., territorialization, homogenization, legal standardization) occurred to create a modern
nation. Id.
11 Anthony Smith, Ethno-Symbolism and the Study of Nationalism, in NATIONS AND NATIONALISM: A R EADER 24
(Philip Spencer and Howard Wollman, eds., 2005).
12 Id. at 25.
13 Id. at 28.
10

nation[s],” as powerful social and civic institutions like government education systems and legal
codes developed symbiotically with a social contract between the members of the nation, who
demanded the right to participate in its governance, and the government, which was to provide
such institutions in exchange for the “blood and treasure” given it by its people.14 Even the
territorial aspect of the modern nation was an innovation at this time—for most monarchical
societies, governance was not confined by strict geographical boundaries, but was exercised as
“different bundles of powers over different areas and groups.”15
In the European context, the beginnings of the modern conception of a nation trace back to
the first half of the nineteenth-century, when, in England, some property-owners were given the
right to vote and cities became able to elect Members of Parliament, and in France, the longstanding monarchical power was tempered by a constitution which provided a system of selective
electoralism for a lower parliamentary house. 16 Even with these radical changes, the difference
between pure monarchy and these allegedly different systems was negligible: in England only
three percent of the population was enfranchised, and in France, a paltry one-half of one percent
was enfranchised.17
Monarchies and entrenched elite powers already viewed nationalist movements as an
existential threat by this early point,18 but many in the French aristocracy still considered Alexis
de Tocqueville’s January 1848 forebodings that they were “‘sleeping in a volcano … [and that]
the wind of revolution [was] in the air’” to be an overly dramatic perception of reality.19

14

Jack Snyder, The Broken Bargain: How Nationalism Came Back, 98 FOREIGN AFF. 54, at 55 (2019). Snyder also
points out that in some regions, states developed in areas not ethnically homogenous, and homogeneity occurred by
the decidedly less civil means of ethnic cleansing and expulsion. Id. at 55 (citing Ernest Gellner generally).
15 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, in NATIONS AND NATIONALISM: A R EADER 65 (Philip Spencer and
Howard Wollman, eds., 2005).
16 Mike Rapport, 1848: YEAR OF REVOLUTION 2 (2009).
17 Id. at 3.
18 Id. at 4.
19 Id. at 42.

Tocqueville’s premonition, however, soon proved to be quite accurate; just the next month, mass
protests against the monarchy and its associated elite took hold of Paris, and with the nascent
technological developments of railways, steamships, and telegraphs, news of the revolt spread
quickly to other European kingdoms and inspired popular demand for constitutional government
and its related institutions.20
Like the exponential rate at which such technologies developed during this industrial age,
so too did the winds of radical governmental change blow quickly. Just the next month after the
February revolution in France, workers and students organized mass demonstrations throughout
the German states, and dozens of delegates from said states assembled to collectivize demands for
“‘a more complete assembly of trusted men from all German peoples,’ [and] a ‘pre-parliament’
[…] to arrange elections for a German national assembly,’ which in turn would draft an all-German
constitution.”21
These particular demands exemplify the modern idea of a collective nation comprised of a
common ethnic people operating a democratic liberal government. This combination of ethnicbased coalition-building and constitutional governance thus far typical of this pivotal year also
took hold of the Magyar ethnic group in what is now called Hungary, where liberal-minded
revolutionaries made many of the demands as their French and German counterparts, but with a
more decided emphasis on ethnicity or nationality: their list of requirements included the expulsion
of non-Hungarian troops as well as the absorption of Transylvania from Romania. 22
The tenets of the Hungarian uprising quickly proved to be the harbinger of attitudes that
were to flourish throughout the rest of these blossoming European republics. In France, the seed

20

Id. at 57—58; Rapport notes that in Germany, for example, revolutionaries demanded not just constitutions, but
also a free press, jury trials, and a popular militia. Id.
21 Id. at 59 (citations omitted).
22 Rapport, supra note 16 at 68.

which had sprouted the continental push toward republic-building, the republican uprising
organizers sought to parlay their country’s famed revolutionary spirit into “an energetic foreign
policy … sending patriotic armies bursting forth, liberating Italy and Poland and spreading the
gospel of democracy.”23 While they saw their success in establishing a provisional democratic
government as but one piece of a continental puzzle, the actual members of that government were
less inclined to support revolution elsewhere, and in order to extinguish ideas of transnational
solidarity, they appealed to nationalist sentiment. 24
B. Nationalism in Europe
While democratic constitutions did not begin coming to fruition until the mid nineteenth Century, nationalism was easy to find on the European continent well before that. There
are varying definitions of nationalism. For some, nationalism is “an awareness shared by a group
of people who feel strongly attached to a particular land and who possess a common culture and
common history marked by shared glories and sufferings.”25 This conception of nationalism
centers ethnic commonality as its most important factor. Others would define nationalism as more
focused on the civic or political unit of the nation, identifying it as “the doctrine that the cultural
unit of the nation, whether defined along civic or ethnic lines, should be congruent with the
political unit of the state.”26 Although there is a possible ethnic element in this definition of
nationalism, what separates it from historical ethnic collectivism is that its primary marker is that
“political loyalties … coincide with national boundaries.” 27 Still others define nationalism along
different lines, such as Smith’s definition of “an ideological movement for attaining and

23

Id. at 114.
Id. at 115. Rapport notes that the “firebrands” did not listen to the nationalist urgings, however, and still pushed
for cross-border solidarity in overthrowing monarchies. Id.
25 Marvin Perry, The Evolution of Modern European Nationalism, 13 J. OF EAST AND WEST STUDIES 23, at 23.
26 Snyder, supra note 14, at 54.
27 Id.
24

maintaining identity, unity and autonomy of a social group some of whose members deem it to
constitute an actual or potential nation.”28
While these definitions certainly share similarities and are likely applicable to many of the
same iterations of so-called nationalist movements, the lack of a precise definition serves as an apt
symbol for the failure of political and academic commentary to take into account the sometimes
subtle but frequently significant differences between the various movements.

A failure to

acknowledge that not all of these movements are the same lends legitimacy to the argument that
the more invidious of these movements are the victims of bias, thus enabling them to garner
sympathy.
Such failure is commonplace: one scholar suggests, “Elie Kedourie’s definition … remains
widely accepted: a nationalist doctrine ‘holds that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that
nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate
type of government is national self-government.’”29 While this definition might not be in actual
contradiction with the others noted (or the countless alternatives found throughout various
academic disciplines), it is perhaps over-encompassing (individual nationalist movements might
not necessarily care whether other countries or people are self-governed, and indeed, many of them
believe that their own group’s ethnic superiority demands that they govern other “inferior”
territorial ethnic groups), and clearly the assertion that this is the accepted definition is overstated,
as is evidenced by the existence of so many different conceptualizations.
A belief that all “nationalist” movements truly belong under the same umbrella term is also
plainly inaccurate and should be corrected for its own sake: the nationalist movement of Northern

28

Smith, supra note 11, at 30.
Brian Porter, The Social Nation and Its Figures: English Liberalism and Polish Nationalism in Late Nineteenth Century Warsaw, 101 THE AM. H IST. REV. 1470, 1472 (1996) (citing Elie Kedourie, NATIONALISM 9 (3rd ed.
1960)).
29

Ireland bears little resemblance to many of the nationalist movements throughout the rest of
Europe and it is a disservice to its supporters to co-categorize them. Part of the difficulty in
precisely defining nationalism comes from the significant variances among movements all
claiming to be “nationalist.” As will be explained, Northern Irish nationalism has traditionally
sought different aims than many other European nationalist movements, but it is necessary to
provide background of European nationalism before those differences can be properly understood.
1. Historical Nationalism in Europe
To understand today’s rising nationalism, it is crucial to understand the historical tradition
from which it derived. As Marvin Perry notes, “[t]he essential components of modern nationalism
emerged at the time of the French Revolution [because] [t]he Revolution asserted the principle that
sovereignty was derived from the nation, the people as a whole.” 30 Thus, well before the 1848
Spring of Nations, the idea that the state was the product of its people rather than its monarch had
significant support.31 It is this ideology, that the people of a nation are the source of that nation’s
power, that allowed for the symbiotic development of modern, anti-monarchical nations, and
nationalism.32 For the Jacobin revolutionaries, the nation took the place in the heart that was
typically held by religion: it became the only non-trivial thing, deserving of total reverence. 33 The
newly conceptualized relationship between the nation and its people, though, also gave those
people a quasi-religious importance in that “[t]he modern state was now regarded as deriving its
sovereignty from the people, not from God.”34

30

Perry, supra note 25, at 24.
Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 25 (citing J.H. Hayes, THE H ISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF M ODERN EUROPEAN NATIONALISM 55 (Richard R.
Smith, 1931)).
34 Breuilly, supra note 15, at 66.
31

Some of the same voices of the French Revolution, however, also envisioned the nationstate not just as an object of revery in its own right, but as the essential mechanism through which
individual liberty, equality, and the ideals of the Enlightenment could be protected. 35 Thus was
born the arguably fundamental tension between nationalism and liberalism, as a focus on the
interests of the French in particular was difficult to square with the principles of universal
equality.36
In much the same way that the ideas behind the 1848 revolutions would later naturally
spread throughout Europe, the premise of nationalism took root in other parts of the continent at
around the same time that they did in France. 37

In some cases, these developments were

concurrent. Hungary, notably, underwent a radical shift from feudalism to liberalism as part of
the 1848 sea change in only a few weeks.38 Hungarian liberalism was heavily dependent on ethnic
considerations, with a focus on Magyar independence from the Hapsburg Empire; when parliament
increased suffrage rights, it was only for male speakers of Magyar. 39 The Hungarian liberal agenda
went beyond voting rights, and also included press freedom, religious freedom, and an end to the
effective caste system of serfdom and nobility privilege. 40 But nationalism lurked as a
simultaneous powerful force in the movement for radical Hungarian change, as t he Magyars
sought not only to increase the power outside of the imperial elite, but also to annex land beyond
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Perry, supra note 25, at 25.
Id.
37 Id. at 26. Perry notes that, for example, the German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder, in the late 18 th century,
coined the term “Volksgeist,” or, “the soul of the people” to describe the idea that “each people was unique and
creative” and that they expressed this uniqueness culturally, through language, literature, and folk traditions. This
German cultural nationalism, however, embraced a monarchical government as an expression of that rich past,
instead rejecting French ideas of state-enforced liberty. Id. at 26—27.
38 Perry, supra note 25, at 28.
39 Id. Language fluency and gender, of course, were not the only requirements of suffrage, as only male Magyar
speakers who owned property were enfranchised. Id.
40 Id.
36

their own territory in the hopes of (in their eyes) improving its Serb, Slovak, and Rumanian
inhabitants into national and cultural Hungarians. 41
In England, the seeds of nationalism42 were planted even sooner than elsewhere on the
continent.43 Because of its geographic isolation from the rest of Europe, England was uniquely
able to develop “the growth of a national feeling” as early as the seventeenth century.44 In England,
this nascent nationalist sentiment fell on the side of the chasm wherein it progressed in tandem
with liberalist ideas, rather than in opposition to them. Because the English were able to look
inward and improve domestic economic conditions, the conditions for individual liberty, a uniform
legal code, parliamentary willingness to care about public opinion, and an end to feudalism were
ripe.45 Perhaps it is due to this long history of nationalist thought in England that it “was the first
country where a national consciousness deeply embraced the whole people.”46
2. Pre-World War European Nationalism
If the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries largely birthed European nationalism, the turn
and first half of the twentieth century saw its apex, and the point at which its dangerous potential
became impossible to ignore. Although nationalism is essentially about promoting the union of
the national people and the apparatus of the state, it cannot be ignored that “nationalism is as much
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Id.
The conceptual existence of English nationalism is arguable, and frequently argued. While Newman makes the
argument that English nationalism not only exists but is comparable to other common forms of nation -state
nationalism, Kumar posits that as an imperialist nation England’s brand of nationalism can only be compared to the
quite different forms typical of Russian or Turk nationalism. Still others would argue that English nationalism as
distinct from United Kingdom nationalism does not exist at all. Compare Gerald Newman, THE RISE OF ENGLISH
NATIONALISM (1987) with Krishan Kumar, Empire and English Nationalism, 12 NATIONS AND NAT’LISM 1 and
Jeremy Black, Book Review, FOR. AFF., Mar./Apr. 2019.
43 Hans Kohn, The Genesis and Character of English Nationalism, 1 J. OF THE H IST . OF I DEAS 69, 70 (1940). Kohn
points out that Tudor rule “laid the foundations for that national homogeneity which was the necessary condition for
the later development of nationalism” in the late fifteenth century. Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 91.
42

about exclusion as it is about inclusion.”47 As Perry notes, “[e]xtreme nationalism was a general
European phenomenon, but it was especially dangerous in Germany.” 48 There, by the end of the
nineteenth century the Volkish thought tradition had evolved from more benign pride in German
cultural tradition to a belief in the inherent superiority of the German spirit, and the implication
that Germany should reject the Western liberalist order in favor of its own national traditions. 49
Germany, though, was not the only example of nationalist-inspired danger, and this danger
would soon prove catastrophic. Proponents of the liberal order in the previous century had
mistakenly imagined that the replacement of overreaching monarchies with nationality-based
states would lead to peace between them. 50 However, the underpinnings of racial supremacy that
had taken hold of nationalist movements like that of Germany now led these nations to believe that
subjugation of others was appropriate.51 One salient example of this is the German nationalist
argument against the minority Poles in Prussia in the late nineteenth century. 52 In later years,
Hitler would build Nazism off of both this disdain for other ethnic groups and the related belief
that the Germans were entitled to expand their nation, writing in Mein Kampf that “‘[t]he only
thing that will ensure a people its freedom of existence … is sufficient space on this earth.’” 53 The
consequences of this ideology need not be recounted here.
But it is not just the nationalism within an ethnic majority that can lead to warfare. As Van
Evera notes, nationalist-driven policies which oppress minorities can lead to reactionary violence
by either inspiring violent backlash directly from those oppressed groups, or by motivat ing the
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Oliver Zimmer, NATIONALISM IN EUROPE: 1890-1940 50 (2003). As will be later addressed, there is an important
distinction between different nationalist movements based on who the movement seeks to “exclude.”
48 Perry, supra note 25 at 30.
49 Id. at 30—31.
50 Id. at 36.
51 Id.
52 Zimmer, supra note 47 at 55.
53 Anthony D. Smith, NATIONALISM IN THE TWENTIETH C ENTURY 74 (1979) (citations omitted).

homelands of the oppressed to instigate violence against the oppressor nations. 54 The obvious
example of this possibility is Archduke Franz Ferdinand’s assassination by the Serbian nationalist
Gavrilo Princip in response to the Austro-Hungarian empire’s annexation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.55 Though of course there were myriad others, this assassination is frequently touted
as one of the primary causes of the first World War. 56
C. International Law in Response to the Great Wars
After the conclusion of the First World War, the victorious European states combined
efforts with the United States to recreate the international order such that the vulnerabilities which
had led to such a large-scale disastrous conflict would not be repeated.57 In particular, the victors
gave significant attention to the abrogation of minority rights which had contributed to nationalistic
resentment and transnational aggression.58 The solution that this effort reached was the creation
of an international regime intended to resolve such tensions: in creating the League of Nations and
redrawing the European map, nationalism was indeed viewed as potentially problematic (owing to
the concern regarding the subjugation of minorities), but it was also for the first time a relevant
factor in the creation of state boundaries. 59
In addition to the focus on human rights in the post-war peace deals, the victor countries
focused heavily on economic factors, namely by requiring Germany to pay massive reparations
both as a punishment for its war guilt and as a means to ensure it could not afford to go to war

Stephanie Van Evera, Hypotheses on Nationalism and War, 18 I NT’L SEC. 5, 14 (1994).
See, e.g., Not Forgotten, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/obituaries/archives/archduke-franz-ferdinand-world-war.
56 See, e.g., id.; I ND. DEP’T OF EDUC.: World War I Resources,
https://www.doe.in.gov/sites/default/files/standards/guide.pdf.
57 See, e.g., Horne, supra note 3.
58 Rhona K.M. Smith, 20–21 I NT ’L H UMAN R IGHTS LAW (9th ed. 2020).
59 Id.
54
55

again for a long time.60 The peace treaties reduced Germany’s territory by a whopping fourteen
percent and its population by over six million citizens. 61 As previously noted, transforming one
nation’s citizens into another’s ethnic minority can lead to dangerous forms of nationalism.62 This
section will briefly explain the creation of liberal international institutions as a means to prevent
World War III and to protect the human rights of the citizens of their member states. It will then
posit that “human rights” as a concept is frequently understood incompletely, as in many
conceptualizations economic rights are left out of the definition.
1. Post-WWI Liberalism
In 1945, following the horrors of World War II, fifty-one countries once again saw fit to
attempt a regression into such violence and this time created the United Nations (UN). 63 The
following year, the League of Nations was formally dissolved and its mandate given instead to the
UN.64 Once again, economics played a significant factor in the post-war order, this time at the
1944 Bretton Woods conference, culminating in the creation of the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).65 While these institutions focused on regulating possible
fluctuations in the international market through loans and financial aid,66 the 1948 Marshall Plan
provided for U.S. aid to western European countries, stipulated on open transnational markets as
a boost to the liberal cooperation of international workers. 67

60

See, e.g., Olivia Lang, Why Has Germany Taken so Long to Pay off its WWI Debt?, BBC (Oct. 2, 2010),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11442892.
61 Klaus Schwabe, World War I and the Rise of Hitler, 38 DIPLOMATIC H ISTORY 864, 864 (2014).
62 Van Evera, supra note 54.
63 U.N.: H ISTORY OF THE UN (2015).
64 ENCYCLOPEDIA B RITANNICA: THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (2020).
65 Snyder, supra note 14, at 57.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 56—57.

Though human rights law has a complex and disputed history,68 for the purpose of
understanding how modern nationalist movements can affect human rights, the crucial starting
point is the post-WW2 years, and the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) by the UN in 1948.69 Based on this Declaration, The Council of Europe (which had also
been founded following the War with the aim of protecting human rights and promoting
democracy), drafted and signed its own European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in
1950.70
2. Economic Rights as Human Rights
Although many of the rights guaranteed by the UDHR and the ECHR overlap, and the
latter contains a “Safeguard for existing human rights” which states that “[n]othing in this
Convention shall be construed as limiting … any of the human rights … which may be ensured
[under other existing agreements between parties],” one noticeable difference between the two
documents is the lack of an equivalent to the UDHR Article 23 right to work in the ECHR. 71
During the drafting of the UDHR, head of the drafting committee Eleanor Roosevelt parlayed her
long-held belief in the importance of labor rights into ensuring that international labor
organizations held a prominent role in the document’s development. 72 It is not by mere chance

Smith explains that “[t]here are divergent views as to the origin of human rights,” with some considering basic
rights found as early as the thirteenth century to be “human rights,” while others see the start of human rights law in
the late eighteenth century creations of the American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the
Rights of Man. Still others would argue that the protection of minorities by the League of Nations and other WWI
peace treaties are the true start of human rights law. Smith, supra note 11, at 8–10.
69 U.N., UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF H UMAN R IGHTS, H ISTORY OF THE DOCUMENT,
https://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/history-document/index.html.
70 EQUALITY AND H UMAN R IGHTS C OMMISSION, What is the European Convention on Human Rights (Apr. 19,
2017), https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/what-european-convention-humanrights#:~:text=Originally%20proposed%20by%20Winston%20Churchill,came%20into%20force%20in%201953.
71 Compare G.A. Res. 217 A, Universal Declaration of Hum. Rts. art. 23 (Dec. 10, 1948) with Council of Eur., The
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that the International Labour Organisation (ILO) was one of few parts of the League of Nations
that also played a key role in drafting the UN’s Declaration; rather, it owes to Mrs. Roosevelt and
the inclusion of a American Federation of Labour (AFL) representative in the full-time staff of the
UN that workers’ rights were considered an indispensable piece of the new peace. 73
Article 23 guarantees, in four short sentences, that everyone has the right to work freely
and in just conditions, the right to equal pay for equal work without discrimination, the right to
just remuneration sufficient to ensure “an existence worthy of human dignity,” and the right to
collectively bargain in the form of trade unions. 74 The vision of the ILO that was absorbed by the
UN was not based solely on ensuring fair labor for its own sake, but on the understanding that
“universal, lasting peace can be established only if it is based on social justice.”75 It was, to them,
quite clear that labor rights were part and parcel of human rights, having just witnessed the use of
slave labor as one aspect of the most egregious human rights violations known to man. 76
Two short years later, though, when the Council of Europe set forth its own human rights
document, this element was absent.77 Although trade unionists were in attendance as part of the
roughly eight hundred delegates at the 1948 Hague Congress, they likely lacked in relative
prominence among the mélange of participants that included famous politicians and heads of state,
philosophers, poets laureate, and various other cosmopolitans, led by Winston Churchill. 78
Perhaps it is owing to this more obscure position than that of unionists in the first iteration of the
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UN that workers’ rights were decentered, and not formally recognized in the resulting rightsprotecting document.79
The post-war liberal institutions with a purely economic focus like the IMF, the European
Economic Community (the predecessor to the EU), and the World Bank operate in such a way as
to promote a world order in which states retain general autonomy while entering into a sort of
shared sovereignty.80 To accomplish this, they employ a general design of “regulat[ing] policy
externalities arising from societal interactions across borders.” 81 By contrast, human rightsfocused regimes are primarily aimed at “hold[ing] governments accountable for purely internal
activities.”82
Perhaps the belief that economic rights are not as serious as human rights (or else their
domestic violation would too be the concern of the international community) derives from these
operational differences, or perhaps from the exclusion of workers and economic rights from one
of the primary human rights documents; regardless, human rights scholarship frequently has the
unfortunate viewpoint that “economic freedoms … [are] not an element of human rights.” 83 In
reality, the right to work and its companion protections are vital to the security of human rights:
when people cannot work, inequality and instability flourish. Human rights violations are more
likely to occur under these conditions than under a fairer economic paradigm. 84
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Thus, it is imperative to acknowledge that socio-economic rights cannot be divorced from
human rights conversations without “exacerbate[ing] many of the evils [human rights policies] set
out to eradicate.”85 The frequent absence of economic and labor rights from human rights
definitions artificially narrows the field to the detriment of the people whose rights most need
protecting, namely those with little social or fiscal capital. To adequately address human rights
concerns, we must understand that socio-economic rights are as vital as more obvious rights, like
those of freedom from torture or arbitrary detention. By recognizing labor rights as equally
important, those interested in maintaining peace, stability, and human rights for all will be better
equipped to prevent the human rights atrocities which skulk in the wake of these types of softer
rights violations.
III. European Nationalism Redux
While the liberal institutionist experiment has had success in staving off nationalist
surges in Europe,86 they are now once again on the rise in several areas. 87 Two particularly noteworthy examples are the powerful Hungarian nationalist movement, helmed by the political
party Fidesz, and the movement in Great Britain that propelled the idea of Brexit to success.88
This section will explain first the background of modern Hungarian nationalism, followed by the
threats that movement presents to human rights. It will then delineate how Brexit relates to
nationalism and how it also threatens human rights, specifically for those living in Northern
Ireland.
A. Modern Hungarian Nationalism
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Since WWII and the subsequent formation of the EU, there has been relative peace among
its member states.89 As with the other previously described liberal international institutions, the
EU (and its forerunner the EEC) seeks to achieve its goal of transnational cooperation by means
of “‘some surrender of sovereignty’” by its members in service of a regulatory, rights-protecting
supranational organization.90 While this structure has been seen and promoted as a necessary
ingredient in the EU’s ultimate goal of preventing war and human rights abuses, after several
decades of success it is now facing significant backlash.91 Not unlike the nationalist movements
of the eighteenth century, today several such camps have gained popularity and political traction
globally, largely as a response to widening economic inequality, belief in the decrease of national
sovereignty, and, importantly, disruptions to demography and cultural hegemony. 92
While nationalism has seen a revival and political success all over the world, its surge in
Europe in recent years has been particularly widespread. 93 This backlash to the dominant
international order became increasingly prominent across the continent in response to international
power player Germany’s opening of its borders to a large influx of refugees in 2015. 94 Belgium,
the seat of the EU, then applied pressure on other EU member states to alleviate some of the
demand on Germany by also accepting migrants. 95 New European nationalism has drawn more
attention than similar movements in other parts of the world both because it flies in the face of a
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supranational order that has seemingly been mostly successful, and because of its British
iteration’s success in the Brexit referendum. 96 Other than Britain, one particularly representative
embodiment of the forces driving European nationalism is Hungary.
1. The Nationalist Movement in Hungary
Given its history as a classic site for nationalist sentiment, it should come as no surprise
that in the modern wave of nationalism Hungary is and has been a leader. In the 1990s, before
Hungary joined the EU, its Fidesz (Young Democrats) party leaned left and did not enjoy
significant political power.97 In response to a poor showing in the 1990 elections, however, Fidesz
rebranded itself as the representation of the nationalist right, which led in subsequent elections to
greater gains.98 For Fidesz and its supporters, the Hungarian nation is defined not solely by its
territorial borders, but includes the ethnic Hungarians living outside of them. 99 Fidesz has been
remarkably adept at transforming the political conversation in Hungary, effectively changing the
competition from a left vs. right debate to one “between those forces that represented the nation
and those forces that, by extension, did not.”100 This transition allowed Fidesz to reframe issues
to reflect this divide.101 But interestingly, even with this nationalist agenda, EU membership was
generally supported on all sides of the political divide. 102 For a nationalist party, EU membership
seems counterintuitive, but for Fidesz’s agenda of representing the interests of all ethnic
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Hungarians, the EU served as a vessel through which it could achieve a “borderless Hungarian
nation.”103
However, after defeat at the polls in 2002, Fidesz leader Victor Orbán pushed his party
further right, rejecting liberalist ideals and blaming his loss on the med ia and inclusive
democracy.104 Appealing to the cultural memory of former Soviet control over the region, Orbán
“depicted Brussels, the site of E.U. headquarters, as ‘the new Moscow.’” 105 Orbán’s newfound
disdain for the EU was prescient: years before Belgium would ask EU members to accept migrants,
Orbán anticipated their upcoming arrival, and purposefully stoked anti-Muslim prejudice.106 In
the years following Fidesz’s political defeat, Orbán and his ilk also shored up significant support
from anti-Semitic and anti-Roma political groups.107 The coalition of these supporters launched
Fidesz back into the majority of the national parliament, with Orbán regaining his role as prime
minister in 2010.108
2. Nationalist Threat to Human Rights in Hungary
With his second election to the post of prime minister, Orbán quickly set out to concentrate
and entrench power in himself, using all tools at his disposal to take over Hungarian media and
weaken any possibility of a judiciary check, and attacking political critics and any groups receiving
funding from outside of Hungary.109

Orbán has also ramped up anti-immigrant, pro-

ethnonationalist sentiment within Hungary to alarming levels. 110 This hostility to immigrants,
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minorities, and the EU power structure has gone beyond mere (though still dangerous) rhetoric
and manifested in actual policy. Significantly, in 2001, Fidesz sponsored and passed the Status
Law, which allowed for Hungarians living beyond the country’s borders to apply for Hungarian
Identity Cards which granted their holders special access to the Hungarian labor market and other
entitlements.111 Although not inherently anti-minority, this law represented danger in its rejection
of EU anti-discrimination and favoritism mandates112 and delivered a message of Hungarian ethnic
superiority. Following pushback from the EU for these reasons, Hungary amended the law by
extending its labor provisions to all applicants in neighbor countries but kept in place the
Hungarian Identity Cards,113 effectively removing the international legal barriers while still
asserting Hungarian supremacy.
This digression from the liberal institutions which have served as a guard against human
rights violations has shown several sides in Hungary of late. The structure of the EU has, somewhat
ironically, contributed to rebellion against it. It is not just the requirement that member nations
sacrifice some of their sovereign power as a requirement to join that leads some critics to complain
it is antidemocratic: there has also been growing discontent among some members about the fact
that governance of the EU is left not to elected officials, but to experts. 114 Where the divide
between democratically-backed accountability and liberalism becomes too wide, illiberal
nationalism has a tendency to rear its head. 115 What is ironic, however, is that the solution (at least
in the case of Hungary) is not to assert and ensure increased democracy, but instead to replace
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liberalism with authoritarianism.116 Describing Hungary’s trajectory in such a way is no mere
exercise in conjecture: in a 2014 speech, Orbán himself asserted that Hungary would no longer be
a liberal nation, and instead would become a work-based state in the vein of China, Russia, and
Turkey.117 In the place of democratic liberalism, Orbán envisions a Hungary of “one [party …]
built on ‘ethnonationalist foundations.’”118
Since then, Orbán has made good on this promise, and Hungary’s hostility to minority
groups and immigrants has steadily increased. During the 2015 European migrant crisis, almost
400,000 mostly Muslim asylum-seekers crossed the border from Serbia into Hungary. 119 Although
a substantial portion of them were only passing through Hungary en route to Germany, which had
pledged to take in one million refugees, this large a throng tested the capacity of the smaller and
less wealthy state.120 In response to this incident and generally to the European refugee crisis,
Hungary has passed a spate of anti-immigrant policies.121 One well-publicized such policy was
the erection of barbed wire fences around various points of the Hungarian border. 122 Shortly after,
Orbán created “transit zones” on the Hungarian-Serbian border, followed by a policy mandating
that any asylum-seekers had to apply for that status from such a transit zone, wherein they must
remain detained for the entirety of the process. 123
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Although Orbán has claimed at times that “Hungarians have ‘no problems’ with the local
Muslim community,”124 he has also publicly stated that “Hungarians have ‘the right not to live
together with populous Muslim communities.’”125 Thus, observers of Hungarian policy in recent
years are likely to note that, although Viktor Orbán has denied charges of racism and
xenophobia,126 the laws which he and his party have promoted tell a different story. In addition to
the more obvious threats to the human rights of minorities and immigrants in Hungary evident
from these new laws, there are somewhat subtler tells of Fidesz’s disregard for the human rightscentered post-WWII world order. One interesting example is the 2014 construction, in the midst
of the already existing monuments to various points in Hungarian history dotting Budapest’s
Freedom Square, of a seemingly innocuous Memorial to the Victims of the German Occupation. 127
Without context, one would struggle to conjure anyone more worthy of memorialization
than the victims of German aggression in WWII. However, the context here is vital: in reality, the
entrance of the Nazis into Hungary was less an “occupation” than it was “the unimpeded
movement of German soldiers onto friendly territory.” 128 Glossing over this fact (and arguably
going beyond that to historical revisionism) ignores the fact that Nazi action in Hungary was both
specifically anti-Semitic and actively assisted by the Hungarian state. 129

This disturbing

development highlights the very real dangers to human rights presented by Orbán’s reframing of
a clearly anti-Muslim policy shift as simply being aimed at the protection of Hungarian culture,
customs, and “Christian tradition.”130
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B. British Nationalism and Brexit
While nationalism has reared its many heads throughout large swaths of the globe as of
late,131 a handful of iterations have garnered significant attention as compared to others. In
particular, the media attention to the 2016 election of Donald Trump in the United States need not
be recited here, though it is useful to note that Trump himself has compared his election to the
Brexit vote, calling it “‘the exact same thing.’”132 Two years later, in the global south, Jair
Bolsonaro was elected President of Brazil, drawing comparisons to Trump133 and with
commentators and scholars noting that many of the extremist tactics taken by Bolsonaro and his
supporters are following the playbook utilized by far-right Trump supporters.134 Even before
Trump’s rise in global recognition, the oppressive regimes of Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip
Erdogan in Russia and Turkey, respectively, exemplified dangerous nationalist agendas in action.
For the new European nationalists, though, the most encouraging political development has been
the 2016 referendum in Britain to leave the EU, or Brexit. 135 Though it has yet to go into effect,
the effects of Brexit have been noticeable even outside of Britain; not long after England’s136 vote
to leave the EU, the newly-developed Nationalist Europe and Freedom Coalition (a group of far-
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right leaders from across the European continent) met two times within one year, and brought
attention to the Brexit vote as a success for the nationalist movement. 137
1. Brexit as a Nationalist Success
Any political development which results from a democratic vote is open to interpretation
as to its ultimate causes, but the true reasons behind Brexit are particularly elusive, or as one writer
describes it, “Brexit is a Rorschach blot into which everybody reads their own preoccupations.”138
However, even with this lack of consensus, one “universally accepted [interpretation] is that it was
a triumph of English nationalism.”139 One rather modern approach to understanding the myriad
reasons that voters in Britain chose to leave the EU,140 undertaken by researchers from City,
University of London, analyzed conversation on the topic on Twitter, and found that roughly
seventy-five percent of tweets about Brexit espoused nationalist sentiments. 141 This should come
as no surprise, given the origins of Brexit as a concept; undoubtedly, [w]ithout Nigel Farage, there
would have been no referendum in the first place.”142 As far back as 2003, Farage has been
attempting to rally the English to leave the EU. 143 In his speech to the European Parliament just
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after the Brexit vote, Farage left no doubt that nationalism was the driving force behind his
campaign, noting that what Brexiteers did was “[reject] the multinationals.” 144
2. Brexit as a Threat to Human Rights
Just as uncertainty regarding Brexit voters’ true motivations abounds, so too does that
regarding what its ultimate effects will be. It is reasonable, though, to presume that it will
ultimately have a negative effect on human rights. In the lead up to the referendum, Nigel Farage
made clear that in addition to his general aversion to multinationalism, his motivations for leading
the Brexit charge also laid in wanting to curb immigration into the UK. One highly publicized
incident which took place just before the referendum vote involved Farage’s posting of an antiimmigrant poster, featuring almost exclusively non-white asylum seekers with the words
“Breaking Point: The EU has failed us all.”145 This poster was considered so offensive by those
without the same sentiments that it was reported to police for inciting racial hatred, in breach of
UK race laws.146 In the time since the Brexit vote, there has been a demonstrable increase in racial
discrimination.147 While, of course, it cannot be said with certainty that the relationship between
the Brexit campaign and increased racial violence is one of causation rather than mere correlation,
research does suggest that “violent, hateful language can inflame people who are already inclined
toward violence and focus their rage.”148
3. Brexit’s Effect on Northern Ireland
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i. Civil and Political Rights
Although voters in Northern Ireland voted against Brexit, its consequences will be no less
real for them than they are for those in England and Wales who voted in favor of it. Following
approximately three decades149 of violence between Irish nationalists and unionists, as well as the
English,150 the “high point and provision culmination of a ‘peace process’” finally occurred with
the 1998 signing of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA). 151 Although some have attempted to
diminish the importance of EU membership in the development of the GFA, common membership
of Ireland and the UK is explicitly referenced in all three strands of the GFA’s plan for governance
and cooperation.152 So important was EU membership to the peace process that the GFA ends
with a wish to “develop still further the unique relationship between their peoples and the close
co-operation between their countries as friendly neighbours and as partners in the European
Union.”153 Also significant is the fact that within the UK-Ireland International Agreement to which
the GFA was annexed is the provision that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would
legally require the consent of the majority of the people therein. 154 Although to most observers
leaving the EU would intuitively be deemed a “change in the status” of Northern Ireland, the UK
Supreme Court has rejected this proposition. 155 Over fifty-five percent of voters in Northern
Ireland elected to remain in the EU.156 As the UDHR specifically codifies the right “to take part
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in the government of [one’s] country, directly or through freely chosen representatives,” and states
that “[t]he will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government,” 157 the UK’s
disregard of Northern Irish will concerning EU membership arguably already violates international
human rights law.
ii. Threats to the Peace Process and Bodily Safety
Considering the global optimism about the effects of the GFA in bringing about peace in a
region plagued for too long by constant conflict, it is only to be expected that what Brexit would
mean for Northern Ireland would be of such importance as to be referred to simply as “The Irish
Question.” The most obvious danger which Brexit presents for those in the six counties of
Northern Ireland is the uncertainty regarding the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic
of Ireland.158 Though this question is yet to be answered conclusively, Britain has made quite
clear that after Brexit goes into effect, “there will be no free movement of persons into the UK.” 159
As the Republic has made no indication of its own plans to leave the EU, this presents a clear
problem, in that it is difficult to see how this policy could be implemented absent a border between
the Republic and Northern Ireland, of which the Republic has stated it is not in favor as well.160
Even if the once heavily militarized border could be avoided through use of modern border
technology, any border at all is likely to dredge up past trauma related to the violence of the
Troubles for the people of Northern Ireland. 161
This psychological trauma is not the only danger posed by “The Irish Question” and its
potential solutions. Although the GFA helped usher in increased stability in the region and
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significantly less violence, tensions between Northern Irish nationalists, or republicans, and
unionists remains high. Just last year, a familiar sound pierced the precarious peace of Derry when
a car bomb exploded outside of a courthouse. 162 Though luckily nobody was injured by the blast,
it served as a stark reminder that the peace represented by the GFA is fragile. 163 A reversion to
conflict is gravely dangerous to any human rights guarantees: it is nearly uncontestable that
“violent conflict causes human rights abuses.”164 Those human rights violations in turn frequently
lead their victims and victims’ allies to oppose the state apparatus, usually by violent means.165
Northern Ireland is certainly no exception. Throughout the Troubles, England routinely committed
what are rightfully considered human rights violations, including indefinite detentions as well as
the highly publicized torturous treatment of sisters Dolours and Marian Price, who were force-fed
while committing a hunger strike in a British prison after being imprisoned for their roles in a
scheme to set off several bombs throughout London. 166 The pain and degradation faced by the
Price sisters in being force-fed was so great, and so publicly abhorred, that eventually the British
government calculated that it was not worth the negative public reaction nor the physical hassle to
continue the practice.167 Following the conclusion of the Price sisters’ hunger strike, the World
Medical Association declared that force-feeding was unethical.168 Many activists concerned about
civil and human rights during this period argued that the practice being labeled unethical rendered
it torture, in contravention of UDHR Article 5. 169
iii. Economic Human Rights
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The more complete understanding of human rights which includes economic and labor
dimensions further clarifies that Brexit will reduce human rights protections for those living in
Northern Ireland. One key aspect of the GFA is the establishment of institutions meant to foster
cross-border cooperation between Northern Ireland and the Republic.170 With the uncertainty
surrounding trade and labor relations once the UK exits the EU, it is unclear whether these
institutions will be able to continue operating in such a way as to satisfy the mandates of the peace
deal. Specifically, although most Northern Irish employers are based there or in Britain, about
thirteen percent of Northern Irish employees work for firms owned elsewhere, with a significant
share of those being in the Republic.171
In the area of trade, again, uncertainty prevails: because of the position of the island of
Ireland on the western edge of the UK, Northern Ireland will face issues relating to trade in goods
with the rest of the EU, as well as with the Republic. 172 Even those residents whose jobs will not
immediately be affected by the deal will lose their current free access to employment within the
EU, once they are removed from its market. 173 Additionally, Northern Ireland has received over
£600 million annually in EU funding, allocated to farming, research, and jobs, among other
initiatives.174 While a loss of economic viability in itself should be deemed a human rights issue,
economic inequality and lack of opportunity was a significant cause of the Troubles 175 , and the
fragile peace will again be threatened should these economic conditions return.
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IV. The Case for Northern Irish Nationalism
Like nationalist movements in general, Northern Irish nationalism is difficult to fully define
and thus its origins are difficult to pinpoint. However, its modern incarnation originated in the late
eighteenth century.176 Similar to some other movements, the basis for this Irish nationalism lay in
ideals of individual rights à la the Enlightenment, and the idea that such ideals could most readily
be achieved through national popular sovereignty.177 In its original form, Irish nationalism was
inclusive, rather than cleaved according to a Catholic/Protestant divide, and its main target was
overcoming political repression.178

Eventually, Irish nationalists did come into conflict with

unionists who wanted to remain under British rule, almost exclusively along divided religious
lines.179

In the twentieth century, Irish nationalism ebbed and flowed in vehemence, but

underlying all phases was one belief: that Britain’s rule over the North was illegitimate as Britain
was an occupying imperialist force, and because of this it was the Irish “duty to expel them by any
means necessary.”180
This section will provide a brief background of another important nationalist movement,
that of India, which successfully expelled British rule after nearly a century of imperial
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domination.181 It will then explain what “success” could entail for today’s nationalists in Northern
Ireland, and how that success could thwart the negative consequences of Brexit.
A. Nationalism in India
The sun never sets on the British Empire. So the old adage went.182 While they might
develop triteness with overuse, cliches do not become such for no reason, and this one is no
exception. At its zenith, the British Empire spanned approximately twenty-five percent of the
globe.183 Although English conquest began much closer to home,184 the “epicentre” of the Empire
at its height, and its base for continuous expansion throughout Asia, was India. 185 Unlike in Wales,
Ireland, and Scotland, British rule over India was not initially an outright assertion of political
rule.186 Rather, the British Crown granted charters for the East India Company which included
traditional government responsibilities like security for sea routes, running mints, raising armies,
and administering civil and criminal justice. 187 Then, with continuous trade monopolization and
expansion, the East India Company eventually took control of the nation itself. 188
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Following the Battle of Plassey in 1757, in which the East India Company defeated an
army of 50,000 with only 3,000 of its own soldiers, the Company parlayed its spoils into still
further expansion.189 Under the East India Company’s rule (Company Raj), 190 Indians were
precluded from holding office in their own country, 191 and although human rights language as we
know it was not yet used,192 this prohibition and some other conditions for Indians living under
Company Raj193 would today likely be considered human rights violations. Eventually, the abuses
by the Company government brought about a mutinous backlash. 194 As a result, the British
government restructured its hold on India such that it now had direct control rather than through
the Company proxy.195

Although this was “intended to increase Indian participation in

governance, … the powerlessness of Indians to determine their own future without the consent of
the British led to an increasingly adamant national independence movement.” 196
Many people today have a simplistic perception of the nationalist movement in India. 197
In reality, Indian nationalism had much deeper roots, and wider branches. As far back as the
aftermath of the 1857 mutiny, when ordinary Indians saw their royals prove largely useless, they
too began to trade historical ideals of natural monarchies for a more western democratic vision and
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an increase in nationalism.198 And while Gandhi has come to represent the lone figurehead of
Indian nationalism, the “the movement is perhaps one of the best examples of … and extremely
wide movement with a common aim” which had “galvanized millions of people of all classes and
ideologies into political action and brought to its knees a mighty colonial empire.” 199 Perhaps
most significantly, Indian nationalists had their sights set on introducing representative
government and expanded franchise, a free press, and free expression and association. 200
B. Political Success for Irish Nationalists
Although the GFA brought to an end the days of rampant violent rebellion by the Irish
Republican Army (IRA) and the related Provisional IRA (Provos), this did not spell the end of
nationalist sentiment on the island. Probably the most representative figure of its transformation is
Gerry Adams. Throughout the Troubles, Adams was known as not just a member of the IRA, but
a veritable leader of the illicit group.201 In 1983, however, Adams was elected to Parliament as a
member of the Sinn Fein party.202 This served as a powerful example of the transition of many
Irish nationalists from their roots to players in the political game, who saw more of an opportunity
to advance their agenda by way of Parliament than car-bombs.203 However, there is no question
that Sinn Fein is an extension of the republicans of the past; in one particularly telling moment,
while Adams gave a speech, a man in the crowd shouted to him to “bring back the IRA,” to which
Adams cheekily replied, “they haven’t gone away you know.”204 After the signing of the GFA,
by which many Irish republicans felt betrayed at the perceived capitulation to continued British
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rule, Adams was quick to point out that what he and Sinn Fein had agreed to was not capitulation,
but a peace deal based on consent, which allowed for the North to unite with the Republic at any
point when a majority of Northerners would vote to do so. 205 The deal was meant not as the end
of the struggle, but just as the end of one chapter of it, still aimed at “‘deliver[ing] the end of British
rule in [Ireland].’”206
1. Protection Against Brexit
It is this consent which could be the key to protecting against the threats to human rights
that Brexit represents. As the modern leg of Irish nationalism, Sinn Fein’s policies serve as a good
marker for the possible alternative to the grim future that continued British rule and leaving the
EU could create. Sinn Fein has made clear that it does not support the no-deal Brexit which looms,
as the only way it would approve of Brexit would be if Northern Ireland was given a special status
in negotiations with the EU.207 Because Britain has yet to proffer any realistic solutions for the
protection of Northern Ireland, Sinn Fein party leader Mary Lou McDonald has stated that she
believes it is time for a new vote on reunification with the Republic, as per GFA protocols. 208 In
itself, this course of action would negate the threats to the civil and political rights which Brexit
threatens, but by extension of the vote’s outcome it would also protect the threatened economic
rights. Furthermore, it would remove the possibility of a reintroduction of a hard border on the
Island, eliminating the chance of this leading to renewed conflict at the dangerous levels seen for
the three decades of the Troubles.
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Like the nationalist movement in India, a revived Northern Irish nationalist movement
could rally its highly variant political factions around the common cause of ending British control,
in the name of democratic ideals and human rights protection209 .
V. Conclusion
The term “nationalism” has been construed too broadly, disregarding the nuances and even
significant differences between different nationalist movements. 210 This generalization has caused
a consensus that nationalism threatens human rights.211 But it is reductionist, and does not
accurately reflect the differences between different nationalist movements which deserve
highlight. From only three examples of modern nationalist movements, it is abundantly clear that
this one term is insufficient to describe such varied political movements. Thus, it is true that
Hungarian nationalism and British nationalism are likely to diminish human rights, while it is a
fallacy to suggest the same about Irish nationalism, which does not share the same xenophobic
roots and which does not have the same goals.
1

Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, another interesting facet of human rights

which presents an interesting aspect of the Northern Irish struggle is minority language rights. As
Nutt & Gray aptly point out, the common nationalist boogey-men of xenophobia and ethnic
discrimination often arise from “the suppression of national identities by imperialist states” rather
than “’atavistic’ antagonisms.”212 Like economic rights, language rights are a component of human
rights that is often excluded from discussion.
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centers not on the right to speak a minority language in one’s private sphere (a right already
subsumed within existing fundamental human rights), but instead with “the right to maintain and
use that particular language in the public, or civic realm – most often in . . . education.”214 In
Northern Ireland, language rights play a key role in the nationalist fight. 215 While in recent years,
both Wales and Scotland have achieved legislative success at protecting their language rights, an
equivalent right in Northern Ireland has reached an impasse. 216 A full fifteen years after the St.
Andrews Agreement was signed, whereby the British government agreed to introduce legislation
known as the Irish Language Act, its passage remains unfulfilled. 217 This Act would reverse some
of the dangers to minority rights to which numerous international rights-based organizations have
called attention, by providing for official recognition of the Irish language, creating a duty for
public authorities to make Irish-language materials available in public services, repeal the
Administration of Justice Act that mandates the use of English only in judicial proceedings, and
crucially, creates a duty on the Department of Education to facilitate use of the language in the
education system.218 While this Act has been proposed for over a decade and allegedly has support
from many sides,219 it remains to be passed, with arguments against it levelling, inter alia, that it
would unfairly give Irish a place above other languages, that it would threaten the “Britishness” of
the North, and that it would cause discrimination against Northern Irish unionists. 220 Language
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rights in Northern Ireland, however, are just another example of a demonstrable way in which
nationalist political success could protect human rights in the region.
What these various case studies in nationalism make clear is that it is important to better
understand the differences in political movements, so as not to succumb to the valid criticism of
failing to understand them fully before condemning them. Thus, it would be helpful for
conversations around nationalism to center the Irish case as a means to exemplify that nationalism
does not inherently contravene human rights, so that it becomes easier to recognize the instances
of nationalism that do.

